In this paper I develop a new approach for identi…cation and estimation of the parameters of an oligopoly model, without relying on a potentially unveri…able equilibrium assumption. Rather, I consider inference on model parameters when the researcher does not know precisely what decision rule …rms use, but is willing to consider a set of possibilities. In contrast to traditional approaches in the literature, the proposed methodology allows …rm behavior to vary ‡exibly across observations, in a manner consistent with many Nash Equilibria. I derive identi…cation results for both homogeneous product and di¤erentiated product markets. Due to the ‡exibility a¤orded to …rm behavior, the parameters of …rms' marginal cost functions may only be set identi…ed rather than point identi…ed. The restrictions of the model are, however, still informative. I …nd that the size of the identi…ed set for marginal cost parameters depends on the elasticity of market demand, the set of decision rules considered, and the functional form assumptions imposed. I formulate how to compute consistent set estimates for marginal cost parameters and demonstrate the proposed methodology with price and quantity data on the Joint Executive Committee, a 19th century railway cartel. To perform statistical inference I implement the methodology of Rosen (2005) to construct asymptotically valid con…dence regions for the partially identi…ed marginal cost parameters. The application illustrates how
Introduction
Structural models of oligopoly markets consist of three components: (i) consumers 'demand, (ii) …rms'cost or production functions, and (iii) an equilibrium assumption. Reliable data on marginal costs are often not available, so marginal costs must be inferred from data on prices and quantities.
When combined with estimates for demand parameters, either estimated in a …rst stage or jointly with the imposed equilibrium conditions, the equilibrium assumption serves to pin down price-cost margins that can be used to back out marginal costs. Since Rosse (1970) this has been standard practice in empirical work in industrial organization. It is well recognized, however, that the implied marginal costs, and in turn the parameters of …rms'marginal cost functions, may then be quite sensitive to the researcher's choice of an equilibrium assumption.
In this paper, I relax the equilibrium assumption, recognizing that it may not be known to the researcher which equilibrium …rms play, or even if they play equilibrium at all. In lieu of an equilibrium assumption, I impose weak restrictions on …rms'decision rules that are consistent with many standard equilibrium assumptions, and I examine the implications of these restrictions for identi…cation and estimation of model parameters. This methodology allows empirical researchers to proceed with estimation when they are uncertain of the precise mechanism by which …rms make their price or quantity decisions, but are willing to impose a more conservative restriction on their behavior. In particular, I investigate the consequence of imposing restrictions directly on …rms' price-cost margins that are consistent with many of the equilibrium assumptions that have been used in the literature, and many sophisticated models of …rm behavior.
Even if the researcher is willing to maintain that the …rms play an equilibrium, there may be many di¤erent plausible equilibria to choose from. In fact, when there is dynamic interaction among …rms over time, microeconomic theory reveals that a multiplicity of equilibria is the norm rather than the exception. 1 Rather than assume that observations correspond to a narrow subset of these equilibria in order to achieve point identi…cation, the methodology of this paper allows the researcher to instead base inference on a set of feasible market outcomes consistent with a large class of Nash equilibria. The proposed methodology is ‡exible so that the exact set of equilibria or decision rules considered can be adapted to those thought most salient for the market of interest. Estimation of structural parameters is then based on the assumption that observed …rm behavior belongs to this set, rather than a possibly unveri…able equilibrium selection assumption. The set of feasible …rm decision rules considered can be thought of as implicitly mapping a set of equilibrium selection rules to implied values for model parameters.
1 See, for example, the discussion in chapter 12, pp. 404-405 of Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) .
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The cost of the ‡exibility a¤orded to …rm behavior is that the model is generally incomplete. As a result, parameters of …rms'marginal cost functions are, except in special cases, only set identi…ed rather than point identi…ed. Even though the marginal cost parameters are not point identi…ed, the data will still be informative when the assumptions of the model are imposed. Exactly how informative depends on the stringency of the imposed behavioral assumptions, functional form assumptions, and in particular on the elasticity of market demand. This is borne out in the identi…cation results of section 4, and illustrated in the empirical application of section 7, which uses a well-known dataset that includes prices and shipment quantities for a late 19th century railway cartel, the Joint Executive Committee.
Despite a possible lack of point identi…cation for marginal cost parameters, this approach has many advantages. First, it tells the researcher what can be inferred from relatively weak restrictions on …rm behavior. A clear bene…t of this approach is that it allows the researcher to determine the extent to which a more restrictive model achieves identi…cation through its assumptions on equilibrium behavior. This then enables the empirical researcher to determine how robust their estimates are to various equilibrium assumptions. In some cases, it may not be clear how …rms set prices or quantities, and di¤erent researchers may disagree as to how …rms make their strategic decisions or which equilibrium they play. By imposing conservative assumptions on …rm behavior that embed di¤erent decision rules, researchers who disagree on the precise mechanism by which price cost margins are actually determined can deduce to what extent their disagreement may e¤ect implied parameter values.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the remainder of the introduction, I discuss the related literature. In section 2, I develop the homogeneous products version of the model and place it in context relative to previous models in the literature. In particular, I formalize the assumptions imposed on …rms' decision rules that replace the standard equilibrium assumptions. Section 3 extends the model to a di¤erentiated products market. In section 4, I derive identi…cation results for both homogeneous product markets and di¤erentiated product markets. In each case, under standard instrumental variable assumptions, the parameters of the demand side of the market are point identi…ed, while cost parameters are set-identi…ed. The identi…cation results in either case show that the size of the identi…ed set for cost parameters depends on the market demand elasticity(ies). Section 5 discusses estimation. Section 6 provides a simple example of how the methodology could be applied to a homogeneous product market with a linear inverse demand and linear marginal cost speci…cation. Section 7 presents an application to data on prices and quantities shipped by the Joint Executive Committee, a railway cartel, and details the new estimation method employed. The application illustrates how the size of the identi…ed set for marginal cost parameters, and therefore the precision of inference that can be drawn, depends on the assumptions brought to bear as well as the elasticity of market demand. Section 8 concludes and discusses avenues for future research. 
Related Literature
Recent results concerning identi…cation of model parameters in this setting build on the recent econometrics literature on partial identi…cation, covered in depth by Manski (2003) . Of the papers cited there, the identi…cation results of this paper are most closely related to Manski and Tamer (2002) . However, while Manski and Tamer (2002) focus on single equation estimation when an outcome variable or regressor is interval measured and all regressors are exogenous, the econometric model of this paper is composed of simultaneous equations with cross-equation restrictions and endogenous regressors, which is concisely represented by a set of conditional moment inequalities.
This requires some new techniques for estimation and statistical inference. Some possibilities include the inferential approaches of Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004) , Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2004) , Shaikh (2005) , Beresteanu and Molinari (2006) , Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2006), and Rosen (2005) . For the empirical example of this paper, I employ the estimator of Rosen (2005) , which is generally applicable for models based on a …nite number of moment inequalities.
The estimator takes the form of a minimum chi-square statistic, which has appeared previously in the statistics literature on multivariate one-sided hypothesis tests.
Research on incomplete econometric models in empirical industrial organization, particularly when the model admits multiple equilibria, is also a recent and rapidly expanding literature. Examples that deal with multiple equilibria in models of entry and exit include Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004) , Tamer (2003) , and Ciliberto and Tamer (2004) . In the context of an English auction, Haile and Tamer (2003) use an incomplete model that nests many possible equilibria to estimate bounds on the distribution of bidders'valuations. Additional research that seeks to estimate model parameters in the presence of multiple equilibria includes Borzekowski and Cohen (2005) and Sweeting (2005) . To my knowledge, in the oligopoly setting I consider, estimation strategies based on only incomplete knowledge of …rms'pricing and or quantity decisions have not been considered. 2 Further discussion of related research in the empirical study of oligopoly models is deferred to the next section, where the model is formally introduced and placed in further context.
A Model For Homogeneous Product Markets
The setting I consider in this section is one in which a researcher observes product price and …rms' quantities produced, as well as demand and cost covariates in a homogeneous product market for a large number T periods. In each period of observation, t = 1; :::; T , the market is assumed to be comprised of the same n …rms. 3 The econometrician has observations of market price p t and 2 There is also a growing literature on estimation of dynamic models of oligopoly. To this point, however, this research abstracts away from dynamic pricing and/or quantity decisions (for example through tacit collusion), while instead allowing for dynamics in other decision variables, such as investment or entry/exit decisions. Examples from the literature include Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (forthcoming), and Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2005) .
3 This assumption can be relaxed, but allows for clearer exposition.
4 quantities q t = (q 1t ; :::; q nt ). Let x t , w t be (vector-valued) perfectly observed demand and cost covariates, respectively, at time t. These may in general include market speci…c components and may include some common components across …rms as well.
Demand in each market is assumed to be determined by the parametric inverse demand function
Where u t is a mean zero demand shifter such that E [u t jw t ; x t ] = 0, Q t is aggregate time t output, are parameters to be estimated, and P ( ; x; ) is downward sloping for all x. Each …rm i = 1; :::; n in period t has marginal costs
where it is an additive mean zero cost-shifter such that E [ it jw t ; x t ] = 0, and q it is the …rm's period t quantity produced. i are the parameters of …rm i's marginal cost function to be estimated, and w t are covariates for observation t. all the …rms'marginal cost parameters. This does not exclude the possibility that there are some common parameters for …rms' marginal cost functions, i.e. that for i 6 = j, i and j share some common components.
To this point, the imposed assumptions are standard in the empirical IO literature. Empirical models of oligopoly markets always include a speci…cation of market supply and demand. What ties the two together is the speci…cation of an equilibrium assumption. Given the parametric speci…cation above, di¤erent equilibrium …rm strategies are generally derived from conditions for pro…t maximization. However, these pro…t maximizing conditions are sensitive to the particular game …rms are assumed to play, the information structure, and the type of equilibrium assumed. For example, perfectly competitive, Cournot, and Stackelberg equilibria all lead to di¤erent conditions for pro…t maximization, and thus di¤erent structural equations from which to derive parameter estimates. Imposing one of these equilibria then yields a pro…t maximizing condition of the form Qt , …rm i's period t market share. Many empirical 4 The only case where it may not seem possible to satisfy equation (2.3) is when @P t (Q t ;x t ; ) @Q = 0. In that case, however, …rms are necessarily price-takers so that price equals marginal cost, and any value of it will su¢ ce. 5 applications also use a market level version of condition (2.3) such as
where
s it it . This market-level version of (2.3) is derived by summing over i, and weighting each equation by s it , and it also embeds Bertrand, Cournot, and monopoly pricing as special cases.
Estimation strategies that invoke an equilibrium assumption have identifying power through the restrictions imposed on it . One restriction in the empirical literature is to specify a particular static equilibrium for all observations, e.g. marginal cost pricing where it = 0 for all i; t. Another is to consider a …nite number of static equilibria, e.g. competitive, Cournot, and joint pro…t-maximization, and then select the one that best …ts the data through a formal testing procedure, e.g. Bresnahan (1987) and Gasmi, La¤ont, and Vuong (1992) . Yet another equilibrium restriction is the so-called conduct parameter method (CPM), which imposes constancy of it or t across time, but treats it as a parameter to be estimated. This approach is more general than the …rst two, because although it is assumed constant, it's value is not …xed a priori or limited to only a small number of possibilities. The next section discusses the limitations of imposing constancy of it (or t ) in order to motivate the approach developed in this paper. Section 2.2 then describes how one can replace the standard type of equilibrium assumptions with a more general restriction that allows it , and thus …rms'markups, to vary ‡exibly across time.
Motivation and Discussion of Restrictions on it
The conduct parameter method embeds many di¤erent static equilibria by combining (2.3), or the market-level analog (2.4), with the restriction that it (or t , respectively) is constant across periods. Under the assumption that it = i for all t, it follows that under particular functional form assumptions and su¢ cient exclusion restrictions i is identi…ed. 5 In this case, the conduct parameter i can then be consistently estimated jointly with the parameters of …rm i's marginal cost function. Bresnahan (1989) gives a thorough discussion of this approach and surveys its use in applied work. Variations of the CPM used in empirical research include Iwata (1974 ), Rubinovitz (1993 , Graddy (1995) , Genesove and Mullin (1998), and Wolfram (1999) , to name a few.
Solving for it ,(2.3) can be rewritten
5 Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) an advantage of the incomplete model of this paper is that it is robust to this possibility.
While the CPM was in part intended to allow for the possibility of tacit collusion, Corts (1999) demonstrates that it may yield inconsistent parameter estimates when …rms play a tacitly collusive dynamic equilibrium. If …rms are actually playing a repeated game in which they maintain tacitly collusive behavior by playing a more favorable SPNE than repeated static Nash Equilibrium, the estimated conduct parameter may be an altogether uninformative measure of …rm cooperation.
The underlying issue is precisely that across periods the conduct parameter it need not remain constant, and is in fact correlated with covariates. In Corts'framework, the ‡uctuations in …rm conduct are due to ‡uctuations in market conditions, i.e. changes in demand or cost covariates that alter the highest incentive compatible pro…t levels. Other explanations for ‡uctuations in the conduct parameter, such as equilibrium selection from a set of possible SPNE, or the existence of a competitive fringe, e.g. Salvo (2005) , could be posited as well. Through simulation of a duopoly market for a homogeneous product in a repeated Cournot game, Corts demonstrates that the estimated conduct parameter need not be consistent for even the average level of …rm conduct, and may in fact be altogether misleading, failing to detect collusive behavior when the average level of …rm conduct is actually close to the highest level achievable. This in turn leads to inconsistent estimates of …rms'marginal cost parameters. Because the CPM in this case concludes that …rms are behaving more competitively than they in fact are, on average, …rm margins are underestimated, and marginal costs are overestimated. 6 Corts'critique has particular bite because the CPM itself will not reveal whether …rms'conduct is indeed constant across periods, unless additional a priori assumptions regarding …rms'behavior are brought to bear. Corts (1999) veri…es formally that the CPM is not well-suited for markets in which …rm behavior changes signi…cantly and often over time. Indeed, in the context of the theories of tacit collusion put forth by Green and Porter (1984) , Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1986) , and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) , Bresnahan (1989 Bresnahan ( , 1024 writes:
These various theories have in common the idea that in an imperfectly informed world, "successfully" collusive industries will have periods of cartel pricing and periods of competition. In general, they imply models with it not necessarily equal to i .
These theories di¤er somewhat in the expected time-series behavior of these two regimes,
as the exact equations determining passage from one regime to the other vary between theories....It is easy to imagine other theories of success or failure in tacit collusion which predict di¤erent patterns; taking all of these theories at once would lead to even more complex potential time series behavior for .
In this paper I address this issue by putting a bound directly on …rms'markups that is compatible with many equilibrium assumptions that have been previously employed. This results in an incomplete model that is su¢ ciently rich to express a wide-ranging class of possibilities for time-varying levels of …rm collusion. To perform estimation and inference I exploit and build on …ndings from the recent literature on identi…cation and estimation in partially identi…ed models.
Unlike the conduct parameter method, I do not restrict it to be constant over time. My goal is not estimation of any sort of conduct parameter, but rather estimation of …rms'marginal cost functions. Of course, if marginal costs could be estimated with enough precision, then quite a bit could be inferred concerning …rm behavior as well.
In place of an equilibrium assumption, I instead put restrictions directly on …rms' price-cost margins. Exactly which restrictions are reasonable will be di¤erent for di¤erent markets, and the empirical researcher must, as always, take care to choose assumptions that are appropriate. As a baseline, I start by positing that …rms make their strategic decisions so that their price-cost margins are positive, but no greater than what could be obtained by a monopolist. While this assumption is consistent with many types of equilibria, even this rather conservative restriction may be violated in some markets. Cases where this assumption would not apply are markets where …rms may sometimes price below marginal cost, such as those with predatory pricing or learning by doing, or cases where some …rms can garner price-cost margins greater than the monopoly margin. The methodology here can, however, be modi…ed in order to embed those sets of price-cost margins thought most salient for the market being studied. For this paper, the restriction of …rms'margins to be between those of perfect competition and monopoly levels will be the most lenient considered.
Restrictions that are not nested by this one are left to future research.
Restrictions on Firms'Markups
Under the assumption that …rms have perfect information (i.e. they observe it and u t ), marginal cost pricing for …rm i is given by p t = mc it , while monopoly pricing yields p t = mc it Q t @P @Q (Q t ; x t ; ) for each active …rm in period t. Thus, restricting price-cost margins to lie between these two extremes yields 8t = 1; :::; T; i = 1; :::; n
This restriction imposes upper and lower bounds on …rms' marginal costs in each period of observation, in contrast with conventional equilibrium assumptions that pin down marginal costs to a singleton. This weaker restriction on …rms' marginal costs is the reason why marginal cost parameters may only be set identi…ed, rather than point identi…ed.
More generally, I consider restrictions of the form 8t = 1; :::; T; i = 1; :::; n (A**)
where 0 it and 1 it , either perfectly observed or imposed a priori by the researcher, serve as known lower and upper bounds, respectively, on …rm i's elasticity-adjusted Lerner index, or equivalently, on …rm i's markup as measured as a portion of the monopoly markup. The perfectly competitive and monopoly bounds are given by 0 it = 0, and 1 it = 1 for all i; t. Another case would occur if …rms were known to be quantity setters, and assumed never to have margins any lower than that achieved by Cournot equilibrium. Then 0 it = s it for all i; t, where s it is …rm i's market share. An equivalent formulation is that 8t = 1; :::; T; i = 1; :::; n; 9 it 2 0 it ; 1 it such that
where it captures the value of the true price-cost margin relative to the would-be monopoly margin.
As this notation suggests, the price-cost margin bounds can be explicitly derived from the conduct parameter paradigm. However, this approach is inherently di¤erent from the CPM because the period t conduct parameter is allowed to take any value between 0 it and 1 it , and no restrictions are placed on the evolution of that parameter over time. There is no "structural" parameter it to be estimated. Rather, it simply o¤ers one way to parameterize the distance of price from marginal cost, on the scale of Q t @P @Q (Q t ; x t ; ). For any …rm and period, the set of it allowed imposes restrictions on …rm markups, and the speci…c values of it o¤er a parameterization of the unobserved level of …rm i's period t markup.
With suitable choice of 0 it and 1 it the restriction (A**) can easily be made less restrictive than many standard equilibrium assumptions. Such restrictions are, however, not automatically satis…ed. In particular, for a given period of observation t, Q t @P @Q (Q t ; x t ; ) does not measure the monopoly markup of the industry, but rather the implied markup if observation t were in fact one in which monopoly power was exercised. For example, if the …rms were in fact playing a Cournot equilibrium in period t, then the value of Q t @P @Q (Q t ; x t ; ) would not be the same as if Q t were instead at the monopoly level. It is worth stressing that both of these restrictions, and particularly the former, are less stringent than those typically imposed by researchers to infer markups, either through the conduct parameter method or by imposing a static Nash Equilibrium. Nonetheless, care must be taken by the researcher to impose reasonable restrictions on …rms' decision rules on a case-by-case basis. For now, I consider the implications of imposing bounds on each …rms' elasticity-adjusted markups, but appropriate bounds must be carefully chosen to suit the application at hand.
Implications From Cross Section and Time Series Data
In this subsection I brie ‡y discuss the di¤erences between the cases of cross section and time series data. First, consider the case of cross section data, where t is instead an index for each distinct market at a …xed point in time. If the markets are truly distinct in the sense that there is no cross-market ownership, then the equilibrium behavior that dictates the outcomes in each market can be treated as independent, conditional on market covariates. That is, it may be reasonable to invoke an assumption such as P f it jw; xg = P f i jw; xg for all t 6 = . If, instead, some of the same …rms are active in di¤erent markets, such an assumption may not be plausible. However, it may in this case be reasonable to impose a restriction on …rm conduct when the same …rms appear in di¤erent markets, e.g. it = i for all markets t; with the same set of …rms present. This is di¤erent from the case of time-series data in a single market. In this case, reasonable patterns of …rm behavior across time can be considered. The folk theorem dictates that repeated interactions among …rms results in a wealth of SPNE. However, if the researcher is able to credibly impose restrictions on the time-varying behavior of …rms, such as those considered by Green and Porter (1984) 7 or Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) , then these restrictions could potentially be imposed for greater identifying power.
The key point is that the time series and cross section data have very di¤erent implications for plausible restrictions on …rm behavior. When the researcher has panel data, both types of assumptions on …rm behavior could potentially be imposed, with those of the …rst type being applied across markets at each point in time, and the latter being applied in each market (or for each set of …rms in a single market) across time. For now I simply restrict attention to …rm behavior resulting in a wide range of static outcomes.
A Model for Di¤erentiated Product Markets
Now I turn to the more complex case of di¤erentiated product markets. For this case, I assume throughout that each …rm's marginal costs are constant with respect to quantity, but may di¤er with period t covariates. As a starting point, I consider the di¤erentiated product oligopoly framework of Nevo (1998) with the added simpli…cation that each …rm in the market produces one and only one di¤erentiated product. There are J di¤erentiated products in the industry, and thus J …rms, and the demand for each product at a given point in time in a single market is
where p t = (p 1t ; :::; p jt ) is the price vector of di¤erentiated products, x t are covariates, are parameters to be estimated, and u jt is a demand shifter for product j that is observed by the …rms prior to making their decisions, but is not observed by the econometrician. The notation Q (p; x; ) denotes the vector-valued function (Q 1 (p t ; x t ; ) ; :::; Q J (p t ; x t ; )) 0 . The variable pro…t (i.e. not counting …xed costs) of …rm j in period t is thus
where mc jt = mc w t ; j + jt is a function of the exogenous cost shifters w t , the parameters j , and the cost shifter jt . Like u jt , each jt is assumed to be observed by the …rms prior to making their decisions, but unobserved by the econometrician. A Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices is then characterized by the equations
for all j 2 f1; :::; Jg, where w; x; ; j have been suppressed for convenience, and where D kjt @Q k (pt;xt; ) @p j , the time t cross-price elasticity of product k with respect to p j . 8 This set of equations derived from the assumption of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium can then be used to solve for each product's markup. If, however, the …rms are not playing a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium every period, estimated markups and marginal cost parameters based on these equations will be inconsistent.
There are many reasons for departure from Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, including the possibility of other static equilibria (e.g. Cournot), collusion on the part of some or all of the …rms, and market dynamics.
Another way of performing inference on model parameters is the so-called menu approach. The idea is to consider a …nite number of possibilities for equilibrium behavior and corresponding …rst order conditions. Which condition is appropriate in a given setting can be tested, as done by 8 D kjt is not a function of t, but may vary with pt and xt.
11 Gasmi, La¤ont, and Vuong (1992) , for example, or can be chosen according to the researcher's judgement. Nevo (1998) summarizes this approach by writing (3.3) in vector notation
where is the identity matrix, and Q t , p t , mc t denote the vector of all …rms'period t quantities produced, prices, and marginal costs. The menu approach entertains the possibility that subsets of …rms in the industry collude. If a subset of …rms in the industry are colluding, the system of equations is modi…ed by setting ij = 1 as well for any combination of …rms i and j that collude. The conduct parameter approach instead allows each ij , i 6 = j, to take any value on [0; 1], but maintains the restriction that the ij are constant across observations. Given this restriction, the researcher could, in principle, hope to estimate the matrix of conduct parameters
. Nevo (1998) makes the point that even in this case, it will often be extremely di¢ cult to have enough instrumental variables to identify these parameters. Even if we did have enough exclusion restrictions to identify the conduct parameters, the argument of Corts (1999) still applies. Both the menu approach and the conduct parameter method have the inherent shortcoming that ij is …xed across periods of observation; as in the homogeneous products case, this is exactly the restriction I relax, and I thus add the subscript t to ij to re ‡ect this.
Equation by equation, we have 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg, 8t,
for some set of values of ijt , where again D kjt @Q k (pt;xt; ) @p j
. As in the case of homogeneous products, the requirements for identi…cation of Q (p t ; x t ; ) are exactly the same as they are under the assumption of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Estimation of the demand-side parameters is wellstudied 9 , so I will again assume that these are observed. Isolating mc jt in the above equation, it follows that for all products j = 1; :::; J,
In place of assuming a particular value for each jkt , I only restrict them to lie in the interval h 12 all observations, 10 D kjt 0 for j 6 = k and D jjt 0, it follows that for all products j = 1; :::; J,
In a perfect information game in which all marginal cost and demand errors are perfectly observed, it simply follows that these inequalities must hold over all observations. Since demand can be identi…ed under the standard assumptions, consistent estimates for demand parameters can be Thus, in a perfect information setup only marginal costs are unobserved to the econometrician.
In order to compare the implications of these restrictions to models that impose equilibrium behavior that pins down marginal costs, it is useful to rewrite the above inequalities isolating marginal costs:
for all j = 1; :::; J. This system of inequalities essentially says that the period t vector of …rms' marginal costs mc t = (mc 1t ; :::; mc Jt ) 0 is known to belong to a subset of R J . Because of the existence of cross-price elasticities in a di¤erentiated product market, there are a plethora of restrictions across the bounds on each …rm's marginal costs. That is, in contrast to the homogeneous product case, the bounds for each …rm's marginal costs include all of the other …rms' marginal costs. If marginal costs are equal across all …rms, so that mc t is a scalar, then this complication no longer exists. Formal identi…cation results are provided in section 4.2.
Identi…cation 4.1 Homogeneous Product Industries
Let q t (q 1t ; :::; q nt ) 0 and t ( 1t ; :::; nt ) 0 denote the vector of period t …rm quantities produced and marginal cost errors. Throughout, I use (q; p; x; w; u; ) to denote a representative realization of (q t ; p t ; x t ; w t ; u t ; t ). Let the observations f(u t ; t ) : t = 1; :::; T g be a random sample distributed 1 0 I am assuming here that all pairs of di¤erentiated products are gross substitutes. This formulation excludes the case where two of the products are complements.
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P such that E [u; jx; w] = 0. (x; w) are assumed to have bounded support, and (q; p) are assumed to have nonnegative, bounded support. I assume throughout that …rms observe (u; ) prior to making their decisions. Firms'decision rules and market demand jointly determine the realization of (q; p) as a function of (x; w; u; ). For clarity I use X; W to explicitly denote X; W as random variables and x; w to denote representative realizations. Thus, E [mc (q i ; W; i ) jX; W ] is a random variable, while E [mc (q i ; w; i ) jx; w] is the particular value of E [mc (q i ; W; i ) jX; W ] for X = x and W = w. Formally, these assumptions are summarized below. B denotes the parameter space within which is assumed to belong, and B is used to denote the identi…ed set for . That is, B is the subset of marginal cost parameters that are logically consistent with the restrictions of the model. Assumption: (A1) Each component of (q; p) has nonnegative, bounded support. (X; W ) have bounded support X ,W, respectively.
Both of these assumptions are standard. A further assumption is Assumption: (A3) The inverse demand function P ( ; ; ) and thus its derivative
Assumption (A3) is motivated by the observation that the parameters of the inverse demand equation are identi…ed under the same exclusion restrictions as in traditional, point identi…ed models. In the inverse demand equation (2.1) Q t is endogenous, since the …rms observe u t before making their decisions. As in standard models, endogeneity can be handled with appropriate instruments for Q t , for which the cost covariates w t are immediate candidates. Because identi…cation of the parameters of a single equation using instrumental variables is well studied and not the focus here, I assume that the researcher does indeed have enough exclusion restrictions to identify and estimate inverse demand independently of the marginal cost function. In the linear example of section 6, and the empirical application of section 7, this condition is easily seen to be met, so that the parameters of the demand equation are identi…ed. 11 Thus, for the purpose of identi…cation, I
restrict attention to the case where the parameters of the demand function are identi…ed and can be consistently estimated, perhaps, for example, by a "…rst-step" regression. Thus for the remainder of this section I treat the inverse demand function and hence its derivative with respect to Q as observed.
I also assume throughout that the inverse demand function is continuously di¤erentiable and downward sloping.
Assumption: (A4) P ( ; x; ) is continuously di¤erentiable in Q and
As a preliminary step for identi…cation the following proposition derives a bound for expected marginal costs conditional on exogenous covariates under (A**) and (A1)-(A4).
Proposition 1 Let (A1)-(A4) and (A**) hold. Then 8 (x; w) 2 (X ; W), for each i = 1; :::; n;
Proof.All proofs are included in the Appendix. When instead a particular equilibrium is imposed, then a moment equation is obtained from each …rm's …rst order condition, which can then be used to estimate the parameters of their marginal costs. Now however, due to the incomplete knowledge of …rms' decision rules, a set of possible moment equations must be considered, as mc (q i ; w; i ) is only known to lie between mc i (x; w) and mc i (x; w). The previous proposition shows that the conditional expectation of (A**) with respect to the distribution of (u; 1 ; :::; N ) bounds the value of …rms'marginal costs conditional on exogenous covariates.
Condition (4.1) is a system of conditional moment inequalities, for each …rm i, that are implied by the restrictions on …rms'decision rules. This system may in general have cross-inequality restrictions, complicating the analysis, much like simultaneity in a system of equations. In the special case where …rms share no common cost parameters, this complication is not present. Furthermore, the presence of the endogenous variables q is a complication in this model just like it is in traditional, point identi…ed models. In particular, the endogeneity of q means that marginal costs may vary with the demand covariates x indirectly through q.
While will in general not be point identi…ed, the above inequalities do place meaningful restrictions on expected marginal costs conditional on covariates, and thus on . Exactly what can be learned as a consequence of the bounds given by Proposition 1 will depend on the particular functional form assumptions imposed, and what quantities are identi…ed by the sampling process.
For example, if one is only interested in bounds for E [mc (q i ; w; i ) jx; w] for each combination of (x; w), then identi…cation of the conditional expectation functions mc i (x; w) and mc i (x; w) will su¢ ce. If instead the goal is inference on the marginal cost parameters , then more will be required if mc (q i ; w; i ) depends on q i . The extent to which (4.1) has identifying power for depends on which components of the inequality are identi…ed by the sampling process. Thus, to further characterize the implications of (A**) for the identi…ed set for , I restrict mc (q i ; w; i ) to fall in the class of parametric forms of assumption (A5).
Assumption: (A5: additive separability) mc (q i ; w; i ) = f (w; i ) + g (q i ; i ). This assumption embeds a number of functional forms from the literature. In particular, constant marginal costs and linear marginal costs are included. When assumption (A5) is violated, Proposition 1 still restricts the feasible values for , and these could be examined on a case-by-case basis. When (A5) holds, the following additional high-level assumption, along with condition (4.1),
can be used to obtain the identi…ed set for of Proposition 2.
Assumption: (A6: identi…cation of conditional expectations) For all (x; w) 2 (X ; W), i = 1; :::; n, mc i (x; w) ; mc i (x; w), and E [g (q i ; i ) jx; w] are identi…ed.
Exactly which conditions guarantee that assumption (A6) holds depend on the functional form of both the inverse demand and marginal cost function. If, for example, inverse demand and marginal costs are linear, then identi…cation of the conditional means E [p t jx; w], E 0 it Qjx; w , E 1 it Qjx; w and E [q it jx; w] will su¢ ce. Given su¢ cient regularity conditions, each of these conditional expectations can then be consistently estimated.
Proposition 2 proceeds to characterize the identi…ed set for , the composite vector of all …rms' marginal cost parameters i , under these additional assumptions.
Proposition 2 Assume that (A**) and (A1)-(A6) hold. Then the identi…ed set for is Proposition 2 characterizes the identi…ed set for the marginal cost parameters, and forms the basis of the estimation strategy developed in section 5. The …rst corollary veri…es that …rms' expected marginal costs conditional on covariates w are point-identi…ed if, conditional on w, there is probability one of a realization of demand covariatesx such that demand is in…nitely elastic. While it may not in general be reasonable to expect demand to be in…nitely elastic for any hypothesized value of demand covariates, this corollary is still worth mention for two reasons. First, if demand is indeed in…nitely elastic conditional on some set of observables, then …rms must be price-takers, and marginal costs can be recovered since it must be that price equals marginal cost. Thus, this presents one case in which we would expect the researcher to be able to identify mean marginal costs, and indeed this methodology satis…es that criteria. Second, identi…cation need not be viewed as an "all-or-nothing"proposition. The corollary presents the limiting case of the observation that the more elastic the aggregate demand function, the smaller will be the identi…ed set for marginal costs and, in turn, the identi…ed set for marginal cost parameters B .
In particular, this characterization of the identi…cation region reveals that the size of the identi…ed set is sensitive to the distribution of Q @P @Q (Q; x; ) = p 1 , where is the elasticity of quantity demanded with respect to price. This result is rather intuitive: if demand is highly elastic, then there is less potential for price manipulation on the part of the …rms, since small changes in price have a large e¤ect on quantity demanded. If, on the other hand, demand is inelastic, then there is more potential for collusive …rms to pro…t, as consumers will not modify their purchasing behavior as much in the face of higher prices. Furthermore, as the polar case of Corollary 1 also illustrates, a relatively small identi…cation region does not require the elasticity to be uniformly high. Rather, if the elasticity is su¢ ciently high on average over a broad enough range of covariate values, a small identi…cation region may be obtained.
A second corollary shows that if marginal costs are linear, then B is convex. Knowledge that the identi…ed set is convex may also be useful to ease the computational burden of estimating B .
Corollary 2
If for all i, mc (q i ; w; i ) = ii + w 0 iw where i = iq ; 0 iw 0 , then B is convex.
Di¤erentiated Product Industries
In this section I derive formal identi…cation results for marginal cost parameters for the case of differentiated products. The starting point for characterizing the identi…ed set is equation (3.4). The environment and the notation follow that of section 3 as closely as possible. Let t ( 1t ; :::; nt ) 0 and u t = (u 1t ; :::; u Jt ) 0 . Using notation similar to that of the homogeneous products framework, I use (q; p; w; x; u; ) to denote representative observations of (q t ; p t ; w t ; x t ; u t ; t ). Formally, the sampling process consists of a random sample of draws of (x; w; u; ) from population ( ; ; P).
The measure P induces a conditional probability measure over (u; ) for each possible realization of (x; w) such that the conditional expectation of (u; ) given (x; w) is zero. Firms'decision rules and market demand determine the realization of (q; p) as a function of (x; w; u; ). As before, I use X; W to explicitly denote the covariates as random variables and x; w to denote representative realizations. B denotes the parameter space within which is assumed to belong, and B is used to denote the identi…ed set for .
Assumption: (B1) Each component of (q; p) has nonnegative, bounded support. (X; W ) have bounded support X W, respectively.
As in the case of homogeneous products, I assume that the dimension of w, the variables excluded from the demand speci…cation, are su¢ cient to identify the parameters of the demand speci…cation, . The requirements for identi…cation of are no di¤erent that those of models where …rms are assumed to play a particular equilibrium.
Assumption: (B3) is identi…ed.
Replacing mc jt with mc w t ; j + jt for each j and taking conditional expectations of the inequalities (3.5) and (3.6), it follows that the true parameter must satisfy the restrictions
for each product j. However, the quantity E
is not identi…ed without adding more structure, since the marginal cost shifters k are not observed by the econometrician. In particular, if the demand derivatives D kj depend on the price of goods aside from good j, then we might expect that D kj and k are correlated, even after conditioning on x and w, since k is correlated with p k . Thus, I impose the restriction that the demand function for each product j is linear in prices, which implies that the cross-price derivatives D kj are constant.
Assumption: (B4) Q j (p; x; ) = pj p + h ( xj ; x), where pj = (D j1 ; :::; D jJ ) 0 , and xj are those components of through which …rm j's marginal cost function depends on covariates x.
Assumption: (B5) E [pjx; w] is identi…ed on X W.
Under these additional assumptions, proposition 3 gives the identi…ed set for the marginal cost parameters .
Proposition 3 Let D kj > 0 for all k 6 = j, and D jj < 0. Assume that (B1)-(B5) hold, and that inequalities (3.7) and (3.8) both hold. Then the identi…ed set for the demand parameters is
Corollary 3 If mc j (w; ) = w j j for all j 2 J, where w j ; j are subvectors of w and , respectively, then B is convex.
As was the case for homogeneous good industries, the identi…cation result given by proposition 3 can be used as the basis to estimate B as outlined in the following section. However, doing so appears to be generally rather di¢ cult computationally. In comparison with the homogeneous products model, there are many more terms in the inequalities that de…ne the identi…ed set.
Furthermore, the bounds on each …rms' marginal cost functions are functions of the other …rms'
(set-identi…ed) marginal costs. The corollary provides su¢ cient conditions for the identi…ed set to be convex, which as in the homogeneous product case may be useful for estimation.
Estimation
The approach I take here in either homogeneous product or di¤erentiated product industries is to estimate the model in two steps. The idea is to …rst estimate the parameters of the demand speci…cation, and then use these "…rst-step"estimates to estimate the identi…ed set for the marginal cost parameters. To perform the second stage, I formulate a population level objective function that attains its minimum only on those values of the cost parameters that belong to the identi…ed set. Estimation then proceeds by computing the set of approximate minimizers of the sample analog of this objective function.
For estimation of the model one can use a standard GMM procedure as a …rst step to estimate demand parameters, and a modi…ed minimum distance (MMD) estimator as de…ned by Manski and Tamer (2002) to estimate the identi…ed set B . MMD estimation is a straightforward method for constructing a sample analog of the identi…ed set. First, the researcher de…nes a population objective function of model parameters Q that is minimized only on the identi…ed set. This is achieved by constructing a nonnegative valued function that takes the value zero if and only if 2 B . By construction, an equivalent formulation for the identi…ed set for the parameters is
Estimation of B then proceeds by constructing a sample analog for the objective function,Q T such thatQ T converges uniformly almost surely to Q over the parameter space B. Then one computes the set of approximate minimizers ofQ T ,
where T # 0 at an appropriate rate as T ! 1. Under su¢ cient regularity conditions,B converges to B in the Hausdor¤ metric as T ! 1. The need for the sequence of T is the same as that of Manski and Tamer (2002) . That is, in order to guarantee thatB contains the boundary of B asymptotically as T ! 1, the inequalities that de…ne the identi…ed set must be relaxed slightly.
The consistency proofs of their paper are generally applicable for MMD estimation based on any nonnegative objective function that is only equal to zero on the identi…ed set, and for which there is a uniformly consistent estimator. Under su¢ cient regularity conditions,B is consistent for B in the Hausdor¤ metric, as long as T converges to zero no faster thanQ converges to Q.
While Manski and Tamer (2002) showed that MMD estimators for set identi…ed parameters are generally consistent, they did not devise a method for statistical inference for MMD estimators.
Indeed, constructing con…dence regions for partially identi…ed parameters is a …eld of current research. To perform inference for the empirical example of section 7, I use the modi…ed minimum distance estimator developed in Rosen (2005) , which is applicable in models that can be written as a …nite number of conditional moment inequalities. The MMD objective function of that paper has the advantage that the asymptotic distribution of T Q T ( ) is chi-bar-square. As described in that paper, this result can then be used to construct asymptotically valid con…dence sets for the parameter , even if it is only partially identi…ed.
While the model used for the application of section 7 can be written as a …nite set of moment inequalities, the general methodology of this paper can result in models that do not …t within that framework. In this case, one would need to use a di¤erent inferential approach to construct con…-dence sets for . Other recent papers that devise a way to perform inference in partially identi…ed models and could potentially be applied include Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004) 
A Simple Example: A Linear Model with Instruments
In order to illustrate the proposed methodology before proceeding to the empirical example of section 7, in this section I consider a simple linear model. The model has both demand and supply shifters that serve as instruments. The market is for a homogeneous good with single period inverse demand function
Further suppose that two …rms compete for consumers in each period of observation, and that each has constant marginal costs given by the following functional form
As before, t indexes the observation, while i = 1; 2 indexes the …rms. u t is an unobserved period t demand shifter, while 1t ; 2t are unobserved marginal cost shifters. 1t ; 2t and u t are assumed to be iid mean zero, independent of each other, and uncorrelated with all of the regressors, so that E [ 1t ; 2t ; u t jx t ; w t ] = 0. These additive demand and marginal cost shifters (u t ; it ) are perfectly observed by each …rm i, but unobserved by the econometrician. The variables p t ; q 1t ; q 2t ; w t ; x t are all observed by the …rms and by the econometrician.
Firms play a repeated quantity-setting game in a market characterized by these linear inverse demand and linear marginal cost functions. Following the behavioral assumptions considered in section 2, they are assumed to play strategies in each period that satisfy the inequalities (A**). In this model, the conditional expectations of these inequalities are
for all i; t pairs. The structural parameters to be estimated in this model are a 0 ; a 1 ; a 2 ; c 01 ; c 02 ; c 11 and c 12 . In this case, w t is correlated with Q t through the …rms' supply relation, but is not correlated with the demand errors by assumption. Thus, w t can be used as an instrument for quantity supplied in estimation of the linear demand equation, and the demand parameters are identi…ed and can be consistently estimated. An instrument for quantity demanded, x t is also available in this model, but the traditional IV techniques are not applicable for estimation of the supply-side parameters c 0 and c 1 , which are not point identi…ed.
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The conditional moment inequalities implied by the model are given by E fp t (a 0 + a 1 x t + a 2 Q t ) jx t ; w t g = 0, The …rst restriction implies that
from which it is clear that the demand parameters are identi…ed, barring linear dependence of these three equations. Furthermore, a 0 ; a 1 ; and a 2 can be estimated consistently by their sample analogs.
To use the full identifying power of the restrictions imposed, I apply Proposition 2 to characterize the identi…cation region. To characterize su¢ cient conditions for identi…cation of , let
The conditions that M is non-singular and that E 1 + Then all that is required is identi…cation of E [QtjX; W ]. If Qt = (xt; wt) + t, for some continuous but unknown function , where t are iid and independent of xt and wt. The conditional mean functions E 1 + 1 t QtjX; W and E 1 + 0 t QtjX; W could then be consistently estimated by kernel estimation, for example.
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Application to the Joint Executive Committee
In this section I demonstrate the methodology with an application to data on the Joint Executive Committee, a late 19th century railway cartel.
Background and Data
Formed on April 18, 1879, the Joint Executive Committee (henceforth JEC) was a cartel that sought to sustain cooperation among rail carriers over the so called trunk-line territory between the Atlantic seaboard and midwest commercial centers. 13 Both eastbound and westbound tra¢ c was monitored and regulated by the cartel, each under di¤erent organizations within the JEC.
Because the JEC predated the formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1887) and the passage of the Sherman Act (1890), the operation of the cartel was publicly acknowledged, and detailed accounts of its operation are well-documented by, for example, MacAvoy (1965) and Ulen (1979) .
The dataset is a time series of weekly observations from the beginning of 1880 through the 16 th week of 1886. For each week, tons of grain, ‡our, and provisions shipped on each of 8 di¤erent rail lines from Chicago to the east coast is recorded. These rail lines were owned by the 5 di¤erent …rms that participated in the cartel for at least some subset of the years considered here. These weekly quantities as well as percentage allotments and cartel prices for each of the goods shipped were recorded by the JEC itself in order to assist in the task of maintaining collusion. Table 1 provides a description of the variables employed from this dataset, and Table 2 provides various summary statistics.
Also available is an indicator L t that equals 1 if the Great Lakes were open to navigation in week t, and equals zero otherwise. Shipment via lake was the main competitor for rail shipments during this period, so L t was an important determinant of demand for rail shipments. As noted by Porter (1983) and Lee and Porter (1984) , one would ideally have data on prices charged for lake shipments, but this data is not available to me. It is, however, known that the JEC at no point in time managed to explicitly include the lake shippers in their collusive endeavors. 14 .
There has been a good deal of prior research on the JEC that has employed the dataset used here. This includes Porter (1983) , Lee and Porter (1984) , Cosslett and Lee (1985) , Porter (1985) , Berry and Briggs (1988) , Hajivassiliou (1989) , and Ellison (1994) . These studies focus primarily on examining explicit models of collusion, and the extent to which the observed data can be explained by particular theoretical models. Their focus is not on the estimation of …rms'marginal costs per se, and in these studies marginal costs are not estimated. In fact, in this line of research …rms' 1 3 Ulen (1979) equilibrium conditions have been aggregated in such a way so that marginal cost parameters may not be identi…ed by the model used, unless further assumptions are imposed. Here, rather than posit a particular theory of collusive behavior, I entertain a wide range of possibilities, and my focus is primarily on the estimation of marginal cost parameters. Of course, in a model that yields precise inference of marginal cost parameters, much could potentially be said about the magnitude of …rms'markups and the extent to which they compete or collude.
Demand Speci…cation and Estimation
I take the functional form of Porter (1983) for the market demand equation as a starting point, but relax the assumption of normal errors. Instead, I assume that the demand unobservable has zero expectation conditional on L and the season dummies S = (S 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 ) 0 . Market demand in period t is assumed to have the log-linear form
The functional form di¤ers from that of Porter (1983) only in that I employ three rather than twelve seasonal dummies, dividing the calendar into quarters rather than four week periods. This structure is imposed to make the large sample approximations for the supply side of the market reasonable with the available data. Each Lake, Season combination implies two moment inequalities for each * Firm 4 was active from week 28 through the end of the sample. ** Firm 5 was active from week 182 through week 323. The mean, median, and standard deviation for …rms 4 and 5 are reported conditional on that …rm being active.
…rm; dividing the year into thirteen seasons rather than four results in some Lake, Season pairs with too few observations to expect reliable inference.
Furthermore, I allow u t to be governed by an AR(1) process, as in Ellison (1994) and Cosslett and Lee (1985) , who found signi…cant serial correlation in the demand errors. That is, I impose that
where t is iid and is estimated as a parameter of the model. I maintain the assumption that u t , and thus u t 1 and t are uncorrelated with both L t and all the season dummies, and I use a two step e¢ cient GMM procedure to estimate the parameters of the demand equation and the autoregressive parameter separately from the marginal cost parameters. The variables DM 1 ; DM 2 ; DM 3 ; DM 4 and the allotments of four of the …rms are used as instruments for ln p t ; that is, I make use of the moment equation E [ujDM j ; A k ] = 0 for j = 1; :::; 4 and k = 1; :::; 4. 15 .
I also consider the speci…cation
along with the AR(1) process for the error term of (7.1). This allows for the elasticity of market demand to vary with whether or not the Great Lakes were open for shipment. Again the parameters are estimated by an e¢ cient GMM procedure, and …rm allotments interacted with L are used as additional instruments. The estimation results of both speci…cations are reported in Table 3 .
The estimates from the more ‡exible demand speci…cation suggest that demand was in fact 1 5 Only the allotments of the …rst four …rms are used because the sum of all …rms'allotments is 1 by de…nition. when the lakes were open, the railway prices for grain shipping may have been, at least to some extent, constrained by the prices of lake shippers, making quantity more sensitive to price changes in those periods. A further di¤erence between the two sets of demand estimates is the estimated autoregressive parameter . The estimate is roughly 3 times as high when demand elasticity is assumed constant across all periods, although it is very highly statistically signi…cant under both speci…cations. The autoregressive parameter has no bearing on marginal cost estimates, however.
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I proceed to estimate marginal costs under each of the demand speci…cations, separately for each of the three …rms that are active over the entire dataset. It is important to note that given these functional form speci…cations, the conduct parameter method, which assumes it = i for each …rm i and all t, identi…es none of the i nor the marginal cost parameters, even when marginal costs are assumed constant. Due to the lack of marginal cost shifters, marginal costs cannot be separately identi…ed from i . The methodology of this paper is, however, still applicable.
Marginal Cost Speci…cation and Estimation
I consider two di¤erent speci…cations for …rms' marginal cost functions, the …rst being constant marginal costs, and the second being linear marginal costs. There are no observed marginal cost shifters aside from quantity, which is endogenous. The speci…cation is
when marginal costs are assumed constant, and
3) when marginal costs are assumed to be linear. it is an unobserved marginal cost shifter such that E [ it jL; S] = 0. The composite vector of …rms'marginal cost parameters to be estimated is = (c 01 ; c 02 ; c 03 ) 0 when marginal costs are given by (7.2) and = (c 01 ; c 11 ; c 02 ; c 12 ; c 03 ; c 13 ) when marginal costs are given by (7.3). The units of the variables are such that mc (q it ) is measured in dollars per 100 pounds of grain. It is assumed throughout that all components of are nonnegative.
I assume that in each period, …rms' strategies are such that market outcomes satisfy the restriction (A**), 1 it = (0; s it ). Given the demand speci…cation, it is convenient to rewrite this restriction as (7.5) where t is the elasticity of aggregate demand in period t: Under (D1), t is given by
while under (D2),
Looking In this model, Proposition 2 implies that the identi…ed set for the marginal cost parameters is given by those value for that satisfy (7.6) Because the Great Lakes were always open in Q3, and always closed in Q1, there are six Lake, Season combinations observed in the sample. As a result, (7.6) yields twelve moment inequalities for each …rm, two for each Lake, Season combination. The set of parameter values that comprise the identi…ed set, B are those values of such that each …rm's marginal cost parameters satisfy each of these twelve moment inequalities. In the case of constant marginal costs, with speci…cation (7.2), these moment inequalities are
while for speci…cation (7.3) they are
pjL; S .
Marginal Cost Estimates Given Demand Speci…cation 1
First, I estimate the identi…ed set for marginal cost parameters when demand is assumed to be given by (D1) 16 . Table 4 shows the estimated bounds on marginal costs for …rms 1-3 when marginal costs are assumed constant. Under the assumption that it 2 [0; 1] for all t, the bounds on marginal costs for each …rm are identical, ranging from marginal costs of 0 to 22c /. In this case, there is no …rm speci…c component to (7.5), as neither marginal costs nor the bounds on marginal costs implied from the demand estimates depend on …rms' quantities produced. When, however, it is instead assumed that it 2 [0; s it ], where s it is …rm i's period t market share, the restriction ( by the shape of the identi…ed set, it seems that …rm 1's marginal costs are potentially the least sensitive to quantity, while …rm 3's are potentially the most sensitive. This re ‡ects the variation in each …rms'quantity produced relative to the bounds on marginal costs implied by (7.5). Under the restriction that it 2 [0; s it ], the estimated identi…ed set for …rm 2's marginal cost parameters is very informative, with the slope of …rm 2's marginal cost function estimated to be no greater than approximately 0.000007. 17 Interestingly, in the case of …rm 3, the speci…cation of constant marginal costs was rejected at the 95% level, but when marginal costs are allowed to be linear in quantity, the model is no longer rejected at the 95% level, although no value of the marginal cost parameters yields a value of 0 for the sample objective function. The parameter values that yielded the smallest value were (c 03 ; c 13 ) = 0:178; 2:8 10 5 . 1 6 The reported estimates for the identi…ed set are those values of the marginal cost parameter (s) such that QT ( ) 0:0001. This cuto¤ was chosen to match the degree of computation error allowed by Matlab's minimization algorithm.
1 7 The slope parameter c1i measures the e¤ect of increasing quantity by one ton on …rm i's marginal costs measured in dollars per 100 pounds shipped. Because quantities shipped were as high as tens of thousands of tons for each …rm, values of c1i on the order of 10 5 are economically signi…cant. For example, a value of c12 of 0.000007 would contribute about 4c / to marginal costs at …rm 2's mean quantity of 5846 tons. 
Marginal Cost Estimates Given Demand Speci…cation 2
Now I consider the implications of using the estimates from demand speci…cation 2 to estimate the identi…ed set for marginal cost parameters. Again, I begin by considering the constant marginal costs speci…cation, and these results are reported in table 5. In contrast to the estimates under (D1), the presence of the interaction term in the demand speci…cation leads to rejection of marginal costs being 0 for each of the three …rms. This conclusion is driven by the periods in which the lakes were open, as the demand elasticity was su¢ ciently high in those periods to indicate that, were the …rms actually engaging in perfectly collusive behavior, their implied marginal costs would still be well above zero. Furthermore, the change in demand elasticities has no e¤ect on the upper bounds of the estimated marginal costs. This is because the upper bound on marginal costs is derived from setting it at its lower bound for each observation. This lower bound is 0 for both cases considered, which cancels the e¤ect of the demand elasticity. If the lower bound on it were non-zero, the di¤erent elasticity would have had an e¤ect on the upper bound on marginal costs.
For the case where it 2 [0; s it ], using the estimated demand elasticities from (D2) does change the implied lower bound on marginal costs, but the direction of the e¤ect, relative to the estimates under (D1), is not uniform across …rms. For …rm 1, the estimated lower bound changes from 11:8c / to 16:6c /, while for …rm 2 the lower bound decreases from 21:8c / to 19:6c /. For …rm 3, there is still no value of c 01 that satis…es all of the restrictions of the model, but now that the interaction term has been included in the demand speci…cation, constant marginal costs are no longer rejected at reasonable levels.
Turning now to the set estimates for the parameters of the linear marginal cost speci…cation, we immediately see from …gures 4-6 that zero marginal costs are rejected for each of the three …rms, as the origin is always excluded. Again, there is a large di¤erence between the estimated identi…ed sets for the two restrictions on …rms'markups. Interestingly, the shapes of implied identi…ed sets do not change by much.
As was the case when demand speci…cation D1 was imposed, there exist no parameter values for …rm 3's marginal cost function at which the sample objective function takes the value zero under the assumption that 0 3t s it . However, the speci…cation is not rejected at the 95% level, and in contrast to the results of section 7.3.1, constant marginal costs cannot be rejected.
The parameter values that minimize the sample objective function for …rm 3 in this case are (c 03 ; c 13 ) = 0:199; 1:3 10 5 .
Conclusion
This paper provides a methodology for estimating …rms'marginal cost functions under relatively lax restrictions on …rm behavior in an oligopoly setting. The empirical literature has long recognized that empirical results may be sensitive to the particular equilibrium assumptions imposed.
To the extent that it is unclear how …rms actually make their strategic decisions in any given market, imposing assumptions on …rm behavior may be problematic, and could lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. The methodology of this paper allows the empirical researcher to relax potentially unveri…able assumptions on …rm behavior, and determine what conclusions can be drawn even if the remaining assumptions are insu¢ cient for point identi…cation. If more restrictions can be credibly imposed regarding …rm behavior across observations, then this framework provides a starting point for evaluating the impact of those additional restrictions.
mc (q it ; w; i ) = P (Q t ; x t ; ) + it Q t @P @Q (Q t ; x t ; ) + u t it .
Taking expectations over (q t ; p t ; it ; u t ; t ) conditional on (x; w) implies for all (x; w) 2 (X ; W), for each i = 1; :::; N . Under the additive separability assumption A5, this becomes mc i (x; w) f (w; i ) + E [g (q i ; i ) jX; W ] mc i (x; w) .
for all (x; w) 2 (X ; W), for each i = 1; :::; N . The identi…cation region for is then given by the set of values of consistent with this statement with probability 1:
Corollary 1
Proof. This is a direct implication of Proposition 2 as @P @Q (Q; x; ) = 0 implies that mc i (x; w) = mc i (x; w) = E [p t jx; w], so that E [mc (q i ; w; i ) jx; w] = E [p t jx; w] for any (x; w) pair such that @P @Q (Q; x; ) = 0 with probability 1 conditional on (x; w).
Corollary 2
Proof. (a) 0 < θ 3t < 1 (b) 0 < θ 3t < s 3t
Figure 3: The estimated identi…ed set and 95% con…dence set for the marginal cost parameters of …rm 3, using demand speci…cation (D1). The estimated identi…ed set is shown in light blue, and additional parameter values that belong to the 95% con…dence region are shown in dark blue. (a) depicts the identi…ed set under the restriction that 0 3t 1, and (b) the identi…ed set under the restriction that 0 3t s 3t . For case (b), there is no parameter value at which the sample objective function is zero, but the 95% con…dence set is non-empty. The point at which the sample objective function is minimized is 0:178; 2:8 10 5 , shown in yellow. Figure 6: The estimated identi…ed set and 95% con…dence set for the marginal cost parameters of …rm 3, using demand speci…cation (D2). The estimated identi…ed set is shown in light blue, and additional parameter values that belong to the 95% con…dence region are shown in dark blue. (a) depicts the identi…ed set under the restriction that 0 3t 1, and (b) the identi…ed set under the restriction that 0 3t s 3t . For case (b), there is no parameter value at which the sample objective function is zero, but the 95% con…dence set is non-empty. The point at which the sample objective function is minimized is 0:199; 1:3 10 5 , shown in yellow.
